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Transgovernance: The Quest for Governance
of Sustainable Development
Roeland Jaap in ’t Veld
Abstract In this chapter, the Summary andRecommendations are included of the first
report of the TransGov project of IASS, Potsdam, authored by Roeland J. in ’t Veld.
For this report the contributions to this volume were used as source of inspiration.1
8.1 Summary: Rethinking Sustainability Governance
8.1.1 Points of Departure
This report aims for innovation by adopting and amalgamating advanced insights
in order to add value to the debate on the governance of sustainable development.
We adapt a specific view on the present patterns of evolution of the world using the
term knowledge democracy (in ’t Veld 2010a). We interpret the recently developed
theories on transitions and transformations with respect to governance, and accept
thinking on second modernity (Beck 1992) as a background idea. Moreover, we
concentrate on dynamics, because the term development necessitates a dynamic
view, and because each societal phenomenon or system is simultaneously
influenced by endogenous and exogenous dynamics. Furthermore, we add ideas
from reflexivity theory, configuration theory and governance theory. We will argue
that the proposed combination of these advanced concepts leads to a new approach
of sustainability governance which we call transgovernance (Fig. 8.1).
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8.1.1.1 Knowledge Democracy
We refer to the evolutionary pattern of democracy as knowledge democracy
because the interactions between politics, media and science have adapted a new
shape with far reaching consequences, in many nations, regions and localities and
on a global level. Representative democracy, as the dominant concept, appears to be
in decay. Its ability to govern the present complex problems is met with wide spread
scepticism. The mediatisation of both politics and science has changed the charac-
ter of both, but also their interaction. As a consequence, the problem-solving
potential of societies is affected.
The Curse of Success?
During the last decade, an influential debate has been conducted on the ‘knowledge-
based economy’. This concept has even become the main policy objective of the
European Union, the Lisbon Strategy. However, there are signs that the strength of
the argument for the knowledge-based economy is weakening rapidly.
The current worldwide economic crisis leads to new, very challenging questions.
These questions refer mainly to the institutional frameworks of today’s societies. It
is therefore time for a transition to a new concept which concentrates on institu-
tional and functional innovation. As the industrial economy has been combined
with mass democracy through universal suffrage and later by the rise of mass
media, one might suggest that the logical successor of knowledge economy is a
new type of governance context, which has been called knowledge democracy (in ’t
Veld 2010) (Fig. 8.2). Knowledge democracy is an emerging concept with political,
ideological and persuasive meaning. The relations between politics, science and
media in the twentieth century, the corners in the triangle, are prone to profound
change, indicated in second-order relationships (Fig. 8.3):
• The bottom-up media do not only supplement the classical media, but also
compete with them.
Fig. 8.1 Combination of theories and concepts leading to transgovernance
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• Participatory democracy is complementary to representative democracy but is
also considered as a threat to the latter.
• Transdisciplinary design or research is not only a bridge between classical
science and the real world but also produces deviant knowledge and insights.
As a consequence we are confronted with tensions, threats and opportunities
which are indicated in third-order relationships, also shown in Fig. 8.3. The tensions
are those we find in second modernity. Society is enriched by the extensions of the
corners of the triangles but it has to cope with the tensions. The first- and second-
order tensions do not disappear in a knowledge democracy but do change character
in the presence of third-order tensions. With regards to empirical research on this
matter, comprehensive studies have not yet been conducted.
As we may observe, the outer points of the extended triangle also strengthen and
stimulate each other. Transdisciplinarity nears participatory democracy, and social
media play crucial roles in large scale communication processes. With this, the
tensions relate mainly to the inside-outside relations in the triangle while the stimuli
relate to the outer point of the corners. Moreover, we might observe relations
between each inner and each outer corner (Fig. 8.4).
This has far reaching consequences for the governance of sustainable develop-
ment in knowledge democracies. We can combine other insights here. The concept
of change from within (intraventions, see Sect. 8.1.4 [in this chapter]) is brought
into practice both in transdisciplinarity and in participatory democracy. Social
change is designed or brought about here bottom-up, out of deliberations between
individuals who are concerned.
The fruitful development of relationships between science and policy making
has been characterised by co-evolution, but as we shall see the conditions for that
are not always met. Indeed, even less than before, the so-called wicked problems
which require a ‘dealing with’ approach rather than an approach which defines
simple solutions, dominate political and corporate agendas. Knowledge democracy
marks the transition of representative democracy to a more mixed political system
in which more direct participation in decision-making by citizens and societal
Fig. 8.2 Twentieth century relationships between politics, science and media
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groups is introduced. It also sees the appearance of social media as an alternative to
the classical media, and the rise of transdisciplinarity to accompany the pre-
dominant disciplinary character of science. For the corporate community, knowl-
edge democracy marks the transition of mere business cases (the business of
business is business) to a responsible ‘green economy’ business case. This involves
stakeholders, and public reporting, with a vision towards the future roadmaps of
producing and consuming, and a sustainable corporate performance.
These developments cause new societal relationships between old and new
institutional arrangements, which are full of tensions. They should neither be
ignored nor can they be solved: they have to be dealt with and if possible made
productive.
I think it is the direction in which we all have to go. Whether you call it green economy or
sustainable development, basically it is aimed at finding production and consumption
patterns that are more in line with the natural limitations of the planet. They are unavoid-
able. They are a must. We are coming up to relatively short term turnaround points; we
must take a U-turn in the next five decades. (Karl Falkenberg)2
Fig. 8.3 Knowledge democracy: Three orders of tensions (After in ’t Veld 2010)
2 This is the first of a series of quotations taken from interviews with influential decision makers or
experts, held for the TransGov project in May/June 2011.
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8.1.1.2 Second Modernity: ‘And’ Instead of ‘Or’
The second concept we embrace is the second modernity viewpoint (Beck 1992).3
This notion states that today’s societal evolution is characterised by the emergence
of tense relationships between contradictory phenomena, by ‘and’ instead of ‘or’.
We accept the viewpoint of Ulrich Beck and others, that the specific character
of the era we live in is no longer determined by the substitution of the former
institution by a new one, but by the emerging tense coexistence of both. They need
each other although there are controversies, and continuous tense relationships.
Rosenau’s (2005) definition of fragmegration, identifying sustainability both as
fragmentation and integration, is a typical example of that character. Another
instance of this is globalization, which on the one hand describes the simultaneous
enlargement of scales of economies, of institutional arrangements and of thinking,
whilst also arguing for local identities and intimacy. In order to properly understand
the meaning of this observation we must digress on globalisation. This phenome-
non, made possible by technological innovations, has led to unknown potentials to
Fig. 8.4 Old and new forms co-exist and influence each other
3 Beck’s research focus is ‘reflexive modernization’ (1992), which explores the complexities and
uncertainties of the process of transformation from ‘first’ to ‘second’ modernity.
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influence economic and other developments elsewhere in a massive manner within
a split-second by transactions on capital markets and others.
Knowledge democracy also has second modernity characteristics: representative
democracy does not disappear because of the rise of participatory democracy. The
classical media stay alive while social media grow, and disciplinary science goes
on, while transdisciplinarity begins to flourish. The relationships however are full of
tensions, and governance in the context of sustainable development will either be
effective or ineffective depending on its ability to handle such tensions.
8.1.1.3 Techno-social Systems: Reflexivity
We have organised our worlds in order to master technologies, to produce goods
and services according to human preferences, to enable people to pursue happiness,
and to avoid as well as fight disagreeable actions and events. The patterns of
organisation are immensely varied and interconnected.
People have organised themselves in stable social systems like tribes, villages,
cities, regions and states, but can be observed also as flows of fugitives, masses,
publics, crowds and other temporary shapes. Moreover, people live in a technolog-
ical manner, that is, they are surrounded by applications of technologies in nearly
every aspect of their activities, and themselves are increasingly becoming parts of
technological systems. Moreover, people are (parts of) ecological-biological
systems, or at least are surrounded by such systems.
All systems are due to change over time, but they evolve in very different ways.
Some seem to change according to an S-curve, while others show tipping points.
We may be able to analyse the change of ecological-biological systems with the
support of natural sciences which lean heavily on regularities, often formulated as
causalities. These regularities shape bodies of knowledge. This type of knowledge
is accumulative in nature: our knowledge about stars nowadays is better than it was
a century ago. Indeed, it can be utilised to forecast, to steer, and to develop.
Social systems however are functioning according to the way in which reflexiv-
ity, as we refer to it, operates. This concept is concerned with human competence to
learn, and to adapt. This competence enables people to learn from any source,
experience, practice, information, knowledge, theory, and so on, and to re-orientate
behaviour subsequently. The inner logic of this learning process is unknown to any
outside observer. As a consequence, the future behaviour of a social system in
general cannot be forecast properly. It is doubtful whether knowledge regarding
social systems can be characterised as accumulative: social systems will learn from
any knowledge known to them. As a consequence, the knowledge may lose its
validity. Knowledge on social systems is volatile in principle.
These considerations about the reflexive nature of social systems and
interactions shed more light on one point addressed further (Sect. 8.4 [in this
chapter]) under the rubric of configurations theory. Systems can often be influenced
from outside. We call a purposeful attempt to influence a system from outside an
intervention (or steering action). We call an attempt to influence a system from
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inside an intravention. The volatility of knowledge concerning social systems
provides a major hindrance in attempts to formulate adequate outside policies for
interventions pointing at change, because the knowledge base is not trustworthy as
far as the functions and characteristics of social systems are concerned. Reflexivity,
or in Giddens’ (1991) terminology reflexive monitoring, leads to intraventions.
8.1.1.4 Configuration Theory and Intraventions
In order to grasp the way in which actions of a certain actor may influence other
actors, we can build on configuration theory (e.g. Van Twist and Termeer 1991).
This theory offers a profound insight into the essential aspects of organising and the
specific approach of organisations. It helps us to develop a more satisfactory vision
on multi-level governance. Organising, according to this theory, takes place via
reflexive processes of argumentation and communication. These processes are
taking place repeatedly and intensely between the members of a group. They
gradually shape a common understanding, a common sense, a common frame, a
common view on reality, and moreover a common idea of meaning within the
group. We call the result of such processes a configuration. A configuration
develops along two dimensions, the social and the cognitive dimension and thus
truth claims emerge with regards to both substance and social relations.
As argumentation and communication decrease in intensity because of the
internal consensus found, fixation begins. The configuration has grown up, but
the danger of a standstill starts to grow. The disappearance of reflection creates
stability but learning stops. Innovation becomes problematic. Inclusion and exclu-
sion go hand in hand.
How can grown-up configurations still then innovate? Not by steering from
outside, but also not primarily by impulses from the leader, the centre, because
the centre is the centre due to social fixation – firm beliefs, vision, leadership, and so
on. The centre, to a certain degree, could even be called the least plausible source of
innovation.
People however live in different configurations: the peer group, the firm, the
church, and so on. They are multiply included in several configurations. Multiple
inclusion may be a ‘burden’, however, it also enables the multiply included actor to
introduce ideas existing in configuration A and also in configuration B. He or she
will be more credible in this role as he or she is engaged in both worlds and hence in
a position to ‘transfer’ meaning. The fact that such an actor may be more often than
not a marginal actor in both configurations may rather contribute to his or her
capacity to bridge divides rather than hindering them. Configuration theory teaches
us to abstain from naı¨ve classical planning, steering or instructing, because the
overwhelming majority of configurations live in the phase of fixation.
We have to reform the existing institutions from within. That is a slow and gradual
approach which requires leadership – and at the moment there is no leadership – but that
is what we need to do. [. . .] The pressure to reform and strengthen existing international
institutions is necessary, and needs to come from civil society too, with a call for reform
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through the merger of existing organisations. We have for example the UNEP and the UN’s
Commission on Sustainable Development– and governments can play these two
organisations off against each other. At the UNEP they say that it is not the forum to
discuss this issue, we have the Sustainability Commission for that – and they do the same
the other way round. And they are running around, fooling themselves and the electorate
when they do so. (Jan Pronk)
More advanced intervention approaches, leaning on the awareness of multiple
inclusion as a device for change, are necessary. Successful steering takes place from
within configurations, not from outside interventions. Therefore we need ‘intraven-
tions’more than interventions.
8.1.1.5 Governance Theory
We can define governance as a collection of normative insights into the
organisation of influence, steering, power, checks and balances in human societies.
With this said, ‘good governance’ is a pleonasm. Governance relates to social
systems. These are reflexive in nature. They learn continuously, with the support
of experience, knowledge, revelation and so on. Creating governance means shap-
ing and influencing social systems, so governance should be reflexive in itself.
Moreover, reflexivity is the engine of learning, and therefore of dynamics, so
governance should be formulated in terms of dynamics. Any governance which
hampers learning, intentionally or not, is doomed to fail in the realm of sustainable
development.
Metagovernance in the definition of Meuleman (2008), is an approach which
aims to design and manage a – situational – preference for a mix of institutions,
consisting of elements of hierarchical, market and network governance. Each of
these exists on its own, but metagovernance can help understand how they should
be related. It is important to note that metagovernance is not exclusively a state
approach: each societal actor can develop a metagovernance attitude.
We are confronted with the well-known puzzle of infinite regress once we raise
the question of how to realise ideas on metagovernance: we would have to decide
first, how to decide on governance, but in order to do so we must first decide how to
decide on metagovernance, and so on. In our world the production of goods and
services is realised by enterprises. The governance of societies is partially governed
by governments, or better parliamentary democracies, and other institutional
arrangements. Governance is also not solely government.
We have not yet found a solution for how they [companies and NGOs] could be more
directly involved. There are open sessions in which NGOs and stakeholders can be present,
so that is certainly a plus. But when the real decisions are made, it is hard to see how you
can involve all of them. (Jos Delbeke)
According to transition theory (see Sect. 8.1.2.6 [in this chapter]) it is necessary
that during transitions changes at each of the relevant levels ‘landscape’, ‘regime/
structure’, and ‘niches’, reinforce each other. The focal term is re-structuration.
Learning is conditional for each actor. Fruitful developments are possible once the
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actors reach a certain degree of congruency: ‘Re-structuration not only involves a
co-evolution between innovative practices and structural change, but also includes
the emergence and evolution of new normative orientations’ (Grin et al. 2010: 319).
In order to learn, iteration is crucial. Iteration should be indicated as a necessary
activity of policy makers. Thus, governance of transitions/transformations is
all about dealing with interactions, asymmetries, congruency, unforeseeable
emergencies, and co-evolution of politics and science in informed debates.
8.1.2 The Challenge of Sustainability Governance
8.1.2.1 Sustainable Development
Sustainable development is all over the place. The concept is broad and vague. The
vagueness of the concept has a Janus face. It has been called a unifying concept
because its vagueness breeds a consensus which might be utilised later. Vagueness
is an asset if it triggers action.
It has been generally accepted nowadays that humankind is able to bring about
irreversible change which partially diminishes the options of future generations.
‘Sustainability’, in this context, is thought to be an answer to the exhausting and
devastating way economies and societies are predominantly using social and
ecological resources, in contemporary times. The normative insight derived from
this notion of sustainability is formulated as the precautionary principle. This
principle leads to the norm that we should abstain from action that reduces the
valuable future options for choice. This norm refers to intergenerational justice.
The concept of sustainability concerns the three major dimensions of human
societies: the economic, social and ecological dimension, also known as the three
P’s of people, planet, profit or prosperity. The reconciliatory character of the
concept raises specific questions as to the judgement on changes which lead to
the improvement of two dimensions but to a deterioration in the third. Until now we
have lacked a satisfactory multidimensional measuring rod in order to pass judge-
ment on these types of changes.
Sustainable development is a container notion. The use of the singular form fits
with holistic viewpoints. The supporters of these viewpoints speak about the
climate, the earth system, the emissions, the planetary boundaries. All of these
are at stake, and global disasters are a constant threat. Such constructs enable us
subsequently to deal with a global challenge that should be met in a well-
coordinated manner. So the normative construction, or better the predominant
framing, of the problematique leads to a specific line of argumentation on gover-
nance. The supporters of this view may be found in international organisations
which make continuous efforts to produce agreement on international binding
agreements, in order to prevent disasters. Basic metaphors like the exhaustion of
the earth are then very useful.
However, people do not experience the climate but a climate in the
neighbourhood. They pursue a good life according to their own values and in
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many cases try to find a satisfactory relationship with the surrounding nature. Their
visible world is not abstract or systemic but specific and concrete. Entrepreneurs
make attempts to design and apply more sustainable technologies. These are also
specific.
Therefore, major discrepancies may exist between views on the systemic world
on one hand and the daily life world on the other. In governance concepts both
views are legitimate, and both should be taken care of. Transgovernance, in the
context of sustainable development and transformations (plural), must also embrace
the human view and must not restrict itself to the systemic view. Restricting
governance notions to the latter might prohibit people and other societal actors
from utilising their competences in order to change the path of development.
We are more aware of what sustainable development is than what it is not. We
feel more comfortable with judgements on improvements of unsustainable
technologies than with notions of optimal sustainability. In some theories on social
integration, the core of social integration is understood as shared unvalues, more
than values. Sharing unvalues, give recommendations as to what should not been
done, and leave more space for variety than the necessity of consensus on necessary
action. The analogy is clear: getting rid of unsustainable technologies leaves room
for varied roads (and roadmaps) towards sustainability.
8.1.2.2 Values
Values are social and psychological concepts. They are rooted in cognition and
emotion, and they can be informed by various sources, including insights. They
concern the beautiful, the good, the true, and the trustworthy. Values urge for
reflection, interventions and intraventions. Socialised values lead to norms that
regulate human behaviour. People live values. Values that are lived, albeit in the
shape of explicit norms, constitute culture. The specific culture of a certain social
system is its identity. Cultures and identities may change over time. This change
however takes place in a reflexive manner. Developments in accordance with
values make sense.
Well-understood self-interest might lead to collective action which respects
ecosystem services and social welfare, and may even produce collective goods.
Egocentricity and free-rider behaviour however demand violence monopoly over a
group in order to ensure sufficient collective goods production.
8.1.2.3 Cultural Diversity
Views on sustainable development vary with cultural backgrounds. How should we
deal with cultural diversity in relation to sustainability, and in particular to the
precautionary principle?
Culture is the production of meaning, and meaning relates to values. Without
values there is no meaning, and no culture. Humankind has brought forward many
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varied cultures. In a certain normative orientation we experience cultural variety as
richness. However, our basic attitude to cultural diversity is more critical than our
attitude towards biodiversity. A society needs a certain cohesion, which is produced
as a moral order, based on consensus on some fundamental values and norms.
Indeed, culture within a society is also sharing some common substantial and
relational values. A society consists of configurations. A configuration possesses
a specific culture but as observed earlier, this leads to outside walls and thus
tensions arise. In particular, the tensions between emerging identities on one side,
accompanied necessarily by outer walls, and the need for cohesion and collective
action on the other will never disappear. Shaping governance therefore, is walking a
high wire.
We may conclude that biodiversity and cultural diversity are both components of
sustainability. We may mourn the loss of a language somewhere on this planet as
much as we may about the loss of a species. However, this does not represent our
general insight. We do not believe that each culture is intrinsically good. On the
contrary, some cultures are horrifying to many. As sustainability also implies the
economic and social dimension, we realise that ‘diversity always is a bedfellow of
inequality’ (Van Londen and De Ruijter 2011: 14). Inequality might be a threat to
sustainable development and thus our attitude towards cultural diversity is
ambiguous.
I think that what is missing is a clear regional and culturally rooted process of development
management. It is not the same to do something for the Arctic people as for people in El
Salvador. Both have the same problems but have very different outcomes. (. . .) At the local
level one of the key issues is to involve women, especially as they are directly related to
survival, and especially in the very poor countries. The World Bank has understood that in
the micro credit system they have a better return rate if they do it with women than with
men. (U´rsula Oswald Spring)
According to second modernity it is probable that from the tense relations
between emerging opposites, variety further increases. Striving for sustainable
development urges us to take these tensions fully into account when dealing with
governance. Governance is a relational concept. Hierarchy needs dependent
subjects, network governance requires interdependency between partners, and
market governance necessitates independent relationships.
Hence, it is fair to assume that different governance styles also reveal how
people consider other people’s values. Complex metagovernance combines the
different archetypes, so that different patterns of relational values are also assem-
bled. In system theory it is held that diversity promotes resilience, while uniformity
breeds fragility. This may also be the case regarding cultural diversity. Diversity
alone leads to chaos; what is probably needed is institutional redundancy, similar to
redundancy in ecosystems.
Reflexivity is the strongest engine of social dynamics. It also relates to gover-
nance. The interaction of the general laws of diminishing effectiveness and of
subsequent policy accumulation as indicated above, lead to crises which enable a
phoenix to arise from the ashes, and to invent new governance arrangements. We
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are aware of the inevitability that government as a major component of governance
will consciously destroy variety according to predominant substantial values, but
also profoundly influence social relations and relational values. How the latter
evaluate is due to reflexivity. We may better observe, with the support of the
foregoing schemes, how these evolutions emerge. We will realise in shaping
governance that tensions are not going to disappear but tend to intensify as
governance solidifies. We understand that the precautionary principle sometimes
demands the destruction of cultural variety. We know that biodiversity and cultural
diversity have similarities but also major differences.
Governance of sustainable development is extremely complex as it must deal
with all the tensions described above and their dynamics, while at the same time it is
itself subject to reflexivity. Aiming at compatibility instead of assimilation appears
to be a useful recipe.
Putting all your eggs in one basket and relying on government seems dangerous, I think you
have to find other ways to do this. Maybe social media will help here – I think the private
sector can also be very helpful here, although they can also cause a backlash. So you have to
try all of these things in the absence of strong government and of institutions that aren’t that
effective – you need a multidimensional, multi-track approach. (Eileen Claussen)
8.1.2.4 Planetary Boundaries
Recently a powerful new concept about global developments has been published:
the idea about planetary boundaries. How to deal with the governance implications
of this concept? The major difficulties that the concept causes are the following
(Schmidt 2012):
• The boundaries are solely formulated in one of the three dimensions.
• The aggregate level of the truth claims seems to necessitate central decision-
making.
• It remains unclear how to disaggregate the boundaries in order to create a frame
of reference for other, de-central decision-makers.
Regarding the first cause, it is worthwhile, or maybe even necessary, to identify
planetary boundaries in the other dimensions of sustainability, in order to restore
equilibrium again. In economics for instance, the concept of a ‘positional good’
resembles the boundary concept. The core idea here is that the utility of certain
goods and services decreases once the supply enables mass consumption. This
decrease may be gradual, but the loss of sociability which Hirsch forecasts as a
fatal consequence of the expansion of the relative share of positional goods in total
consumption, might bear a tipping point character.
When dealing with cultural diversity we have already concluded that a minimum
of social cohesion within a society is needed in order to produce the worthwhile
public goods. This cohesion may be protected by the existence of a democratic
nation-state, but the minimum condition is valid in other regimes too. With this in
mind, loss of social cohesion as it is described in the literature on social capital, also
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leads to the awareness that we trespass a critical boundary if we lose too much
cohesion, for instance either by intense individualisation or by the predominance of
greed in economic affairs.
The third cause should be seen as challenging scientific excellence: The concept
of co-evolution between decision-making and science must be focussed on this
cause. Further research is required as well as think pieces which dig deep into the
question of whether and how global boundaries would be derived from local and
regional boundaries. Transgovernance (as a concept, a method, as a dialogue-style
policy) is again the key here. Geopolitical stratification (the world of a nine billion
population with emerging economies, and new alliances, a multipolar power
system) will be in desperate need for this kind of – as we suggest calling it in line
with our transgovernance concept – mosaic-style way of putting planetary
boundaries together and making them useful for policies.
8.1.2.5 Dealing with Emergencies
Uncertainty prevails in long term decisions. The consciousness of threats or
emergencies creates the sense of urgency which is often necessary to take decisions
at all. As Bachmann (2012) points out, historically emergency response action has
been one of the prime ‘sources’ of environmentalism. However, here the distinction
between the two categories of long term problems is also decisive for the kind of
action to be taken. If the objectives of actions to meet threats are formulated too
roughly, like greening the economy or a change of less than two degrees in mean
global temperature, it remains unclear which measures should be taken, and
whether one should aim at resilience or at persistent interventions.
Adoption of the resilience approach might lead to delay of decision as the best
approach, because in the case of a long lead time between action and effect we may
delay as long as we respect the lead time.
The whole domain of sustainable development is filled with dangers, threats,
risks, emergencies, and related phenomena, but also with options, opportunities,
chances, beginnings and stories of success and progress. Often, environmental
emergencies may serve in a lens-like way to clarify options and problems. In
conventional governance systems – due to their focus on institutions and regulations
– the ‘sudden chance’ and the unforeseen impact are frequently excluded.
In addition, here we should examine both sides of the coin: on the one hand these
phenomena produce a sense of urgency, a momentum for action. This may be
important and precious because many political systems in general are rather
lethargic as the transaction costs of action appear high or are deliberately perceived
as high even when, in fact, they are not higher than the costs of non-action.
On the other hand, hypes, momentum, and the like, are volatile: ‘they do not
keep longer than fish’. Additionally, the transaction costs of regaining momentum
are often considerably higher. Indeed, unless the emergency is gradually converted
in more fundamental components of value patterns and competences in knowledge
and responsible action, the net result of an emergency as far as sustainable devel-
opment is concerned might still be negative. This, again, is a field for
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transgovernance concepts which bring knowledge and action, responsibility and
awareness, engagement and reasoning together. Letting options for transforming
pass by unused is the worst result of a crisis or an emergency.
8.1.2.6 Transformations
Sustainable development is often described as a great transformation in Polanyi’s
(1944) terminology. Our insights into the nature of profound change are deepened by
recognising the insights produced by the advanced transition/transformation theory – as
developed, for example, by Grin et al. (2010). It deals with the multi-level and multi-
scale evolution of technical and social systems utilising a multi-level approach along
the distinction landscape-regime-niche. What happens in the niches is not altogether
separated from regime changes, but the relationships are loose and complex.
We suggest using the term transformation in its plural form. In a world of high
complexity and multifactor drivers of development it seems reasonable not to single
down transformation into a one-size-fits-all approach. The notion of ‘wicked
problems’ supports concepts for transformations that always include a variety of
pathways and features. Furthermore, by using the singular, a large-scale perspective
is often applied or suggested. Yet many if not most of transformative changes are
taking place at a very small-scale level ranging from technological innovations in
niche-markets to adjustments in individual behavioural patterns leading to pro-
found changes if aggregated. Transgovernance is rather about finding and nurturing
such small-scale transformative changes instead of neglecting them for the sake of
large-scale systemic interventions.
8.1.2.7 Towards Transgovernance: Beyond Conventional Governance
How does sustainability governance look when we recognise the concepts of
knowledge democracy and second modernity? The best answer might be that we
do not need a new paradigm, a new orthodoxy, but should develop the sensitivity to
look beyond governance conventions. This implies an approach beyond traditional
forms of governance, beyond disciplinary scientific research, towards more
transdisciplinarity; beyond borders formed by states and other institutions, towards
trans-border approaches; beyond conventional means to measuring progress,
towards new and more interactive measuring methods; beyond linear forms of
innovation, towards open innovation; beyond cultural integration or assimilation,
towards looking for compatibility. In other words, governance for sustainable
transformations requires thinking beyond standardised governance recipes, towards
a culturally sensitive metagovernance for sustainable development. The combination
of these steps beyond familiar sustainability governance, we call transgovernance.
Transgovernance is an approach rather than a recipe. Using this approach,
solutions may differ. We have suggested a number of these possible solutions,
such as global innovation networks of governments and corporations, innovation
tournaments for small and medium enterprises, nation states in a new role as
process architect, and a new diplomacy for international agreements.
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The challenges for sustainability governance leadership go beyond designing
solutions. It is essential to have a long-term orientation, in order to understand the
complexity of our time and to understand the lesson that changes of real-world
configurations often come from inside (intraventions). Leadership needs sustainability
skills. The conventional hard skill/soft skill approach is being challenged.
We see today that individuals play a big role. There are a few leaders in their
countries making a difference. I also think it cannot be just individuals. We need to
make sure that all the things we talked about there is proper information, we
organise structures, discussions we collectively set frameworks that behaviour is
moving in a more knowledgeable, knowledge-based direction. We do need leaders.
Leaders dependent on polling results are not what we need for the fundamental
change (Karl Falkenberg).
8.2 Recommendations
Our Summary introduces several concepts which are crucial for rethinking
sustainability governance: knowledge democracy, cultural diversity, planetary
boundaries and reflexivity, as well as structural changes through emergencies.
Below, examples are provided of possible consequences of using and linking
these conceptual cornerstones. These insights are formulated as recommendations
and are presented on ten sustainability governance themes:
• Developing societal networks that trespass the traditional boundaries of gover-
nance arrangements, involving private and public actors: ‘co-decentral’
arrangements.
• Conditions for better long-term decisions.
• A new diplomacy for international agreements.
• Conditions for a more transdisciplinary science system.
• Checks and balances in science communication.
• Upgrading the relevance of city initiatives.
• Nation states in a new role of process architect.
• Crowdsourcing and volatile publics.
• Creating space for new institutions, and allowing for old institutions to be phased
out or to be transformed into new ones.
• Measuring progress through metrics which are to be found in dialogue-style
search procedures.
8.2.1 New Private-Public Networks: Co-decentral Arrangements
for Technological Evolution
Conventional governance respects boundaries between public and private actors.
Hierarchy and regulatory power are reserved for public actors. Our insights into
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reflexivity bring the observation that many conventional arrangements are useless
as far as fundamental change is concerned. In order to further this we need new,
semi-horizontal relationships. We call these relationships co-decentral. It is possi-
ble to design a private-public network, consisting of corporations, citizen groups
and scientific bodies, that will further sustainable technologies, while public bodies
ensure a level playing field.
Technology and sustainable development have complex and crucial
relationships. On one hand, the precautionary principle produces critical attitudes
towards technological developments that may bring with them considerable risks
and possibly produce irreversible and unfavourable effects. On the other hand, new
technologies may enable humankind to take production in a far more sustainable
direction. An important example is renewable energy.
The technological development in a number of domains lies mainly in the hands
of large enterprises, but in other less mature developments multitudes of very small
firms are responsible for innovations.
Big business has a huge role – the Walmarts of this world – they have a huge possibility of
putting demands down the whole demand chain, the whole structure. And by that – in
combination with what politicians do, in combination with the right price structure, in
combination with civil society and the awareness rising among citizens – they start to just
do things differently to what they did only five years back. (Connie Hedegaard)
We design two institutional arrangements which cope with this diversity:
Proposal 1: A Global Sustainable Innovation Network
Most technology driven markets for consumer goods and services are worldwide
oligopolies. Because of this a limited number of enterprises are in a leading
position. Although they cooperate with universities and other scientific centres,
they themselves provide the leadership for the direction in which the technological
development moves. In many cases they operate in business to business chains with
suppliers and subcontractors. Nowadays they report to the public at large about
their general position towards sustainable development.
The employees in the higher ranks within large companies are – more than on the
average – sensitive to sustainability issues. Within R&D departments, professionals
develop value patterns which are often closely linked to those of important NGOs in
the same domain. Therefore employers with a high sustainability profile are very
attractive to conscious and competent professionals, and vice versa. Thus such a
profile is rewarding in at least two relationships, with clients and with employees.
Public authorities may regulate broadly, in attempts to prohibit unsustainable
developments or to further innovations, but they can hardly influence the paths of
technological evolution chosen by large companies because governments neither
sufficiently understand the most advanced elements of technologies nor the crucial
trade-offs which entrepreneurs are confronted with. Moreover, in large parts of the
world, public authorities cannot dispose of policy instruments which force
entrepreneurs to select a specific critical path for their technological innovation.
Sustainability is one of the main challenges for the decades ahead and the market will not
produce sustainable outcomes – so then there is a major task for international institutions –
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for international institutions, for national government, but also for local government to set
standards and to issue laws within which and on the basis of which sustainability can
advance. The market itself will not produce sustainability to the extent that is necessary.
(Jan Pronk)
However, the competitors and subcontractors, and even remote enterprises
which utilise either identical or related technology, in general have a far better
understanding of these positions.
Generally speaking there are various roads towards more sustainable
technologies. Competitors and scientific partners can make reasonable judgements
with regards to the direction which a certain company chooses.
Consumers, clients – also being citizens – are increasingly sensitive in the long
run to matters of sustainable development. They organise themselves in numerous
ways. These consumer organisations could be powerful allies in the combat for
sustainable development.
We need a regulatory framework in which individual companies function. We all want
market economies, but we all know that they don’t work without rules. Environmental
collateral damage needs to be taken into account. There are cost-producing damages that
society is not capable of shouldering anymore. We have to stop polluting in the way we
have so far, and there are only two ways of getting there: (1) regulate what emissions are
acceptable, and (2) put a price in order to incentivise innovation, in order to better
accommodate the limits of the planet. (Karl Falkenberg)
If we consider the aforementioned chains, networks and other relevant
relationships as a potential landscape for the evolution of governance, we might
envisage the following scenario, which is of course not a blueprint:
• Public authorities may design a regulatory regime which ensures level playing
fields for enterprises that strive for sustainable technological evolution. That
means among other things the following: the competitive advantage that is
collected by entrepreneurs utilising a less sustainable technology should be
considered as false competition. The public market regulators could be enabled
to burden these entrepreneurs with fines, or peculiar taxes.
• The 250 largest companies in the world will set up a co-decentral network in
order to make judgements regarding the preferable patterns of technological
evolution in many different sectors. They will promote the erection of networks
within each sector which encourage the empathic cooperation of suppliers,
manufacturers and subcontractors in sustainable directions. The (global) net-
work will provide a system of communication that produces possibilities for
naming, faming and blaming.
• The existing national and international competition authorities spend the income
they collect on fining to fund prizes and rewards for excellent entrepreneurial
performances in sustainable solutions.
• The network is connected with communities of clients and NGOs who contribute
to dialogues and the collection of information on entrepreneurial practices.
Crowd sourcing is not only used in order to detect data on facts, but is also
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utilised to discover fraud. The power of clients and consumers then is fully
mobilised.
• Research institutes all over the world will be stimulated to select their patterns of
cooperation with companies in such a way that they will be connected with the
strongest sustainability directed networks and chains.
• In this manner the consumer and the citizen would be reunited in a governance
arrangement which combines the value structures of entrepreneurs with the
moral standards of citizens/consumers in a knowledge democracy landscape.
(. . .) if we are all together in this – citizens, business, municipalities, government - then in
the UN structure you should also have more formal representation of for example the
business community; yes I believe that they should be there. (. . .) But I just want to
emphasise that in the end, and that also goes at the UN level, governments, elected
governments have the responsibility. (. . .) You can include business, you can hear them,
you can do a lot of things, but you cannot – I cannot foresee – a system where you have one
country here and you have this huge top 50 company over here – sitting on a par – no I don’t
think that. You should also in the UN system have somebody who is accountable to people
in the end. (Connie Hedegaard)
The existing differences inside the corporate community will shift in direction
and the forerunners will join forces, which will in turn stimulate the mainstream in
the direction of jumping on the bandwagon of sustainability. It would help to enrich
the governance of already existing policies such as the 10 year Framework
programme on sustainable production and consumption. Moreover, links should
be created with existing innovative ideas and initiatives like the Vision 2050 report
of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD).
I think it is an inevitable development because we have a world that is increasingly resource
and pollution constrained. The only way to deal with that is by pushing resource efficiency
and less polluting solutions. That is what is happening. At the same time, though, in a world
which is constrained like that you see competition for resources and for who is going to be
the leading supplier of solutions. There is a race – a green race – and the leading actors are
some of the Asian countries like China. If you want to win the green race you have to
change your domestic market to build scale and demand and skills – that is what China is
doing with its next 5 Year Plan. It is a game plan for the green race. (Bj€orn Stigson)
Proposal 2: Sustainable Innovations Tournaments for Small and Medium
Companies (SMEs)
The above formulated recommendation will also concern those small and medium
size companies which function as subcontractors for the large oligopolists that
shape the network. However, in many domains small companies will contribute
to new technologies without such strings. It will be worthwhile to organise on a
global scale large tournaments for sustainable innovations domain by domain,
where small companies and groups from knowledge institutions may compete for
considerable prizes to be offered by the UN. The already existing networks of cities
could play major roles here too. When compared to many others they are more
aware of rising small stars in the world of sustainable entrepreneurs.
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[Collaborations on sustainability] are happening in large corporations across the globe, but
primarily in developed economies. Small and medium size enterprises, which account for
over 90% of the world’s businesses and 50% to 70% of national GDPs, are not there yet.
(Juan Jose´ Daboub)
8.2.2 Better Conditions for Long-Term Decisions
Sustainability governance has an intergenerational dimension, which implies that
long-term decisions should play an important role. Such decisions require specific
governance conditions (Meuleman and in ’t Veld 2009) which should be addressed
in an innovative way. Transitions such as the typology of developments influenced
by long term decisions are societal reconfigurations. The main conditions are:
• Take into account that different types of long-term decisions require different
approaches. We should distinguish at least two types of long-term decisions:
– Cases with a relatively long period between the policy intervention and the
intended effects: a long lead time. This type demands firm leadership in order
to collect sufficient momentum for the focal decision.
– Cases that demand a long-lasting series of interventions that as a whole is
necessary to cause a favourable effect, following the ‘drop in the bucket’ –
metaphor. This type asks for perseverance, consistency, continuity and
reflexivity.
• Sustainable development requires the consideration of long-term futures; uncer-
tainty and complexity prevail. In some cases we are able to forecast to a
considerable degree, then we may anticipate. In the majority of cases we must
meet the existing uncertainty by concentrating on the acquirement of resilience.
I think we need to come to this broader societal consensus so politicians can take longer
term perspectives. The funny thing for politicians is, these short term conditions make it
easier for them to make longer term commitments. [Example Obama] It’s going to be ten
presidents down the line in terms of fulfilling targets they have made. So it goes both ways.
We need collectively to make sure that they are politically responsible people, that what we
get from them is not only income tomorrow morning and income in 50 years. (Karl
Falkenberg)
• Long-term decision-making therefore requires governance which is primarily
reflexive and resilient, supported by (legal) safeguards to keep issues on track
longer than one or two political cycle(s), and to maintain a certain level of
reliability and stability. In many cases it requires some dominance of network
governance, with hierarchical and market governance ‘running in the back-
ground’. Such a governance mixture presupposes that institutions involved in
long-term decision-making are able to act in a resilient way. This implies
investing in flexibility and in alertness (creating ‘watchdog capacity’), without
making the institutions unstable and unreliable.
• Furthermore, it is important to recognise that long-term impacts of decisions
may become underestimated, because the problems which lead to the decisions
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have reached the end of their policy life cycle. Long-term decision-making may
require policy mechanisms that prolong the policy lifecycle of policy issues.
• It is also important to be transparent and realistic about the limitations of
decision support systems, and to ensure that ethical and political assumptions
in decision support systems are chosen in the political arena.
• The knowledge basis for long-term decisions requires a comprehensive
approach. Knowledge production for long-term decision-making should be a
combination of future orientation, design and research (F-ODR4) bearing many
elements of transdisciplinarity. This demands different process requirements
than the requirements for ‘normal research’ and conventional ‘future-oriented
research’. Participation of actors is one of the key requirements.
• Investing in increasing the long-term oriented values of citizens may make long-
term decision-making more politically feasible: it will be less risky in terms of
losing support from voters.
• The consequences of using the wrong ‘best practices’ in long-term decision-
making processes may be even more damaging then in short-term decisions.
Instead of copying ‘best practices’ it is better to translate them into a form which
works in a specific situation, tradition and culture. The crucial question is: What
works where and why?
Whether we like it or not, we are locked into each other going forward in a way were not in
the past. When we look at these partnerships, there is the question of the role of civil
society. I see civil society as the supplier of trust for these solutions. Even if we are in
agreement in government and business about what should be done, none of us enjoy a high
degree of trust. So we need cooperations with civil society to provide trust for the solutions
and to gain political acceptance of some of the solutions going forward. (Bj€orn Stigson)
8.2.3 A New Diplomacy for International Agreements
Until recently, international agreements have played a major role in the furthering
of sustainable development. It seems, however, that the past years have hardly
shown any further progress.
The speed by which climate agreements are reached at is determined by the slowest player.
For that reason I think that measures at the national level also have to take place in parallel
to these international agreements for us to make progress. (B€arbel Dieckmann)
Widespread dissatisfaction on the effectiveness of many treaties and other
international agreements is one explanation for the stagnation. Our second possible
explanation is that the reflexivity on behalf of the younger nation-states as to the
predominant approaches, concepts, methods and instruments which are put into
practice in international relations has founded the sentiment of being victims of
hegemony.
4 See Meuleman and in ’t Veld (2009).
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There is this discussion if we should, every time we have a new convention, create a new
institution around it. For biodiversity, for Montreal, for climate, for whatever. . .The tricky
thing is: if we spend a lot of time fighting over these institutional things, while we really
need to get some action done, how do we balance these things? . . . I think that what will
bring us most is a structure that supports the mainstreaming and [does] not isolate. (Connie
Hedegaard)
With this in mind, the call for institutional but also cultural variety in governance
is increasing. Indeed, the attempt at agreeing on percentages of reduction of
emissions must resemble a postcolonial hegemonic gesture for those former
colonies which had earlier experienced a delay in economic development and are
only now seeing their economic growth percentages increase. This has produced a
lot of resistance to continuation of the routines leading to yet another binding treaty.
The second modernity viewpoint does not allow the recommendation that from now
on we should abstain from efforts on the global stage to reach agreements, but that
they need to be modified considerably in the following directions:
• Because we have to deal with wicked problems, the complexity of solutions
should match the complexity of the problems, as Hoogeveen and Verkooijen
(2010) rightly argue. This is because such complexity may be better met by a
variety of arrangements working towards a common goal rather than a mono-
lithic, holistic arrangement which tries to capture every aspect of it itself.
• Each party has to realise that cultural variety does not only relate to the
substance of sustainable development but also to the scope, shape and
instruments of binding arrangements themselves; also with respect to these
components fear of hegemony might cause stagnation.
• If on a global scale the differences are too considerable in order to reach
unanimous agreements, it might be wise to concentrate on regional agreements
which would unite a number of more homogenous countries. These differences
may be between actors, which includes culture variety, differences in their stages
of ‘development’, differences in power, or belongings to powerful sub-groups
such as the EU or G77/China.
• Each international agreement must be accompanied by efforts of nation-states to
bring about national and sub-national complementary and synergetic additional
arrangements.
• A new diplomacy is needed, because the variety of relevant actors has increased,
and because the complexity exceeds the competences of traditional diplomats. In
addition, here transdisciplinary trajectories are indispensable, leading both to
cooperation between policy-makers and scientists, as well as between policy-
makers and stakeholders.
• A single treaty, a single instrument is in many cases inferior to a portfolio
approach, if the portfolio successfully arranges for a level playing field.
• Under certain conditions, voluntary agreements with a strong moral appeal,
accompanied by effective naming, blaming and faming mechanisms, might be
at least equivalent to legally binding agreements.
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8.2.4 The Organisation of the Scientific System
One thing that troubles or occupies me greatly is how one can have uncontested knowledge
and information – and yet not act upon it. (B€arbel Dieckmann)
Has science lost public authority? If so, than the support for action perspectives
based upon knowledge has lost its legitimacy. Maybe it is too easy to argue that
public authority as such has disappeared in any societal domain to a considerable
degree. Some specific explanations are offered here.
8.2.4.1 Science and Media
The first explanation is primarily concerned with the manner in which scientists
often behave while appearing in the mass media. Modern science has developed
mainly evolutionary patterns of specialisation into disciplines. Disciplines deal with
an aspect of the world: economics studies choice under scarcity, astronomy studies
the physical and chemical aspects of the universe, and so on. As a consequence, the
main product of scientific activity, namely knowledge, is formulated in terms of
regularities concerning relations between independent and dependent variables
under the condition ceteris paribus.5
All facts have only a value if they can stand the criticism. So you need validation. The
IPCC, which is a huge validation machine and the fact all these researchers wherever they
come from talk to each other, and argue, you know it is quite expensive in terms of
investment but that needs to be done. (Jos Delbeke)
The validity claim is formulated within the specific methodological constraints
agreed upon within the discipline. The methodology serves as an internal tool for
communication, but also as a device in order to immunise against outside criticism.
Contradictory viewpoints may arise, and are even normal, but will be analysed
according to the methodological rules of the game. Among many scientists it is in
confesso,6 that the roots of scientific knowledge are hypothetical in nature.
Scientific disciplines have outer walls. Representatives of different disciplines
may communicate but they will experience language problems. Specific words
have specific meanings within a specific discipline. In the political realm however
societal problems are dealt with. They never bear a monodisciplinary character and
thus monodisciplinary knowledge is never immediately applicable in the solution of
a real world problem. Therefore it has to be amalgamated with other scientific
insights, and moreover with value judgements.
If a scientist responds to the invitation to present scientific insights to a broader
public, he is tempted to leave out all of the complicating remarks about the
5 Latin: ‘All other things being equal or held constant’.
6 Latin: ‘Acknowledged’.
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methodological constraints under which the insight has been formulated.
Journalists do not like such considerations. Moreover it is often assumed that the
scientist’s viewpoint is immediately relevant in relation to the solution of societal
problems. Indeed, the scientist is systematically invited to publically exaggerate the
unconditional character of the truth claim of his insights. In the scientific world he
would make himself vulnerable or even ridiculous by doing so, but in the media
realm this behaviour is a condition for survival as a commentator. Contradictory
viewpoints then become conflicting truth claims, and even real world controversies.
The scientist has entered the world of politics.
Politics is a power game. In politics all weapons are admissible. One of the
popular techniques in politics while dealing with wicked problems is to play two-
level-games: the fight on the level of substance is supplemented with an additional
fight on the truthfulness of the different knowledge sources. In this manner
politicians become interested in blaming the quality of the knowledge producers
who support the hostile viewpoint. This of course results in a decrease of the public
authority of science.
8.2.4.2 Science and Politics: Transdisciplinarity
The second explanation concerns the way in which the scientific system relates to
the other actors in the political realm. As explained above, the satisfactory manage-
ment of so called wicked problems – that nowadays dominate political agendas –
demands transdisciplinary trajectories. Sustainable development is the prime
wicked problem on this globe. Orthodox scientists hesitate to participate in these
exercises, because they hate to move outside of their comfort zones.
The scientific system is organised in such a way that monodisciplinary products
earn the highest prestige. Transdisciplinarity is the trajectory performed by
scientists and policymakers together in order to develop robust action perspectives
by amalgamating scientific and normative political viewpoints. Transdisciplinarity
is seldom punished because the participant in the aforementioned trajectories will
easily step on hostile political toes. In addition, politicians decide on the allocation
of many resources for science.
In some European nation-states we have even observed recently that many
interdisciplinary scientific institutes have disappeared. Moreover, many boundary
work organisations which have built bridges between science and politics have
been abolished.
According to principles of second modernity, the organisation of the scientific
system following distinctions in scientific disciplines should not disappear but be
supplemented with constructions – not necessarily permanent ones – that could
further transdisciplinarity. With this in mind, reorganising the scientific system in
the direction of positive incentives for participation in transdisciplinarity is a
necessary condition for better fits between science and politics in relation to
sustainable development. A number of splendid examples exist which could be
multiplied. Jungcurt (2012) suggests complementing the concept of boundary work
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with a configuration approach based on conceptualisation of the boundary space in
international decision-making which allows the positioning of institutions with
regard to their degree of politicisation and their position in terms of national and
regional representation. Such an approach could be a useful guide in the further
conceptualisation and application of the boundary concept.
The German Ethics Commission on the future of energy was an innovative attempt – I don’t
think we had something like that ever before. It reminds me a bit of the common
programme of unions, business and politicians we had in the 1970s for solving the
economic crisis situation. The question is if something like the Ethic Commission can be
achieved for other issues. I think that big problems should indeed be tackled by more
inclusive deliberation. The Internet can help to connect people with different interests.
(Jo Leinen)
8.2.4.3 Natural and Social Sciences
The third explanation specifically concerns the way in which physicists, chemists
and some biologists frame and formulate their problems. They often seem to
assume that such formulations are objective or neutral. As a consequence they are
quite offended once an outsider points out that these formulations are far from
neutral, and that therefore their positions are political by nature. The earlier
discussion in this report on planetary boundaries is a good but by far not the only
example. It would be recommendable that the above-mentioned scientists pay some
attention to the evolution of the social science discourses during the last century.
Neo-positivist claims on objective social science have gradually become the view
of a small minority.
8.2.5 Checks and Balances in Science Translation
and Communication
In the last paragraph we have paid some attention to the roles played by scientists
outside their own communities. However, other actors also play major roles in
translation and communication of scientific knowledge. If one counts for instance
the unnecessary scandals caused by sloppy, careless or stupid communication by
politicians (and other public officials without sufficient expert knowledge) regard-
ing scientific matters, one would pay more attention to the division of responsi-
bilities concerning scientific communication.
Close to the heat of political conflicts, emergencies or disasters, the political
demand is often to centralise all communication and concentrate it in the hands of
politicians or their delegates. As a consequence only politicians or their spin doctors
speak up. However, they lack authority in scientific matters, and are often careless
in presenting the existing degree of uncertainty. With this in mind, the public
mistrusts them, and mentions so in the social media, where any gold digger can
speak up with suggested equal authority.
Following this, politicians, disliking the mistrust, look for support, and seek
scientists who are willing to state that the politicians are right. In doing so however,
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these scientists leave out the careful messages about the hypothetical character of
their knowledge, nor do they mention the methodological constraints under which
their truth claim holds. As a consequence, pointless conflicts between scientists on
television destroy the remaining authority of science, and the conflicts have taken
a more complex shape as they now bear a wicked twofold character: dissensus
exists in two dimensions, values and knowledge.
Who should speak up in public then? Trustworthy communication should be in
the hands of trustworthy people. Politicians are trustworthy in the debates on
political choices but in dealing with expert knowledge they only remain trustworthy
if they mention very prudently the knowledge base which they rely on.
Experts in public communication should accompany scientists who produce
public statements. In general the intermediary bodies between science and politics
like the planning bureaus in northern European democracies are the best equipped
communicators. However, even they find themselves under pressure not to mention
things which are disagreeable to the power brokers.
Special attention should be paid to the public communication on transdisciplin-
ary trajectories. These bear a specific character: design of action perspectives is the
essence! The public should be informed both about the character of the endeavours
and their results. In this way the confusion could be avoided which causes citizens
to entertain the idea that pure science is at work. ‘Transdisciplinary Panels’ might
do the job as long as they remain clear with regards to their character.
In general, it would be worthwhile to pay still more attention to the necessity of
checks and balances by establishing Neutral Public Editors of scientific information
who receive public resources in order to intervene in public and even political debates
once they conclude that the communication on scientific knowledge has been too one-
sided. The NPE should be independent from political parties, NGOs, as well as existing
corporate or social media and should be rooted in scientific organisations.
Last but not least, scientific knowledge is elitist because most new knowledge
and discourse takes place in commercial academic journals which are not accessible
for everybody. Sustainability governance would, as any other field in which knowl-
edge and innovation is important, profit from broader application of the open-
source method (as used for this report and the accompanying academic book).
8.2.6 City Initiatives
Themajority of humankind lives in cities nowadays. In 2050, the percentage will be 75.
The density of cities is a very important characteristic and the empirical driving forces
of real-world reflexivity, knowledge democracy and the phenomenon of the second
modernity are at work here specifically. The urban habitat is precious. The urban
infrastructure is a crucial factor in energy consumption. Urban agglomerations may
transform into energy neutral real estate and transport systems. The quality of air may
improve considerably once more sustainable technologies are introduced. The UN has
identified cities as a major opportunity for sustainable development, as demonstrated in
the Global Report on Human Settlements 2011 - Cities and Climate Change, UN
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Habitat, 2011. Cities appear to be able to develop private-public partnerships in this
domain easier and quicker than national governments.
Cities tend to learn from each other faster than many other actors. Sustainable
cities are attractive cities and attractive cities are strong cities. Strong cities can be
selective with regards to the access granted to new enterprises. Prioritising sustain-
able new firms will make accumulative progress possible.
I would say that for challenges on a global level, the bottom-up is still important and
needed. The local or city level will agree on policy because it is an easier landscape of
actors. We see that cities are driving things much more than countries, and countries more
than international institutions and agreements. In light of the disillusionment with interna-
tional processes, that local level is what you have to set your hopes on. [. . .] Activities at
that level can help us really move towards sustainability – quickly. (S€oren Buttkereit)
City democracy adapts more easily than other public bodies to the new potential
of participatory democracy. Moreover cities, when compared to others, may better
recognise the niche players who bring real innovation and try to connect these to
related actors and ‘regime’ decision makers. Glocalisation is also related to cities.
A strong movement is developing that urges food producers to be nearby. Regional
and local food gain in popularity and moreover metropolitan agriculture is a
winning concept.
It would be a quiet revolution if national governments would be able to redefine
their positions towards cities in such a way that they would feel responsible for the
optimisation of the constraints under which cities could strive for sustainable
development, instead of trying to prescribe to cities how to act. A striking analogy
could be found with the position of nation-states in the domain of fair competition
aiming at the provision of level playing fields.
8.2.7 National Governments in Transition
Although nation-states are embedded in trans-, multi-, inter- and supra-national
networks, they also still possess a considerable amount of power and discretionary
space themselves. They will not disappear as relevant actors, but their functions and
duties are complicating: they can no longer behave as the authorities which simply
decide either to regulate an aspect of life themselves or to contribute in an interna-
tional global environment the willingness to close binding treaties which will settle
things on a global scale.
The reflexive nation-state will continuously reveal combinations of substantial
and relational values that guide the choices as to the metagovernance of sustainable
development. These choices concern:
• Where to rely on existing/emerging markets;
• Where and how to encourage or regulate private-public partnerships that con-
cern aspects of sustainability;
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• How to improve the implementation of existing international environmental
treaties, and how to deal with expiring global environmental treaties, as well
as where to support new initiatives;
• Where and when to create or close transnational or regional agreements;
• Where and when to stimulate local internal public programmes;
• How to produce a brand of representative and participatory democracy in
decision-making;
• How to build transdisciplinary trajectories towards decisions;
• When and where to utilise crowd sourcing and involvement of publics.
The choices are interrelated: once you leave a matter of concern to a private-
public partnership you cannot at the same time regulate it one sided in any legal
text. With this in mind, the governance arrangements are partially substitutes, but as
we will see below they are also complementary, and reinforce each other. The
argumentation that should be constructed has at least the following building stones:
• How close will the result of a certain arrangement be to the defined optimum?
• How large is the probability of success in the preparation of a decision?
• How large is the probability of successful implementation of the decision?
• How large are the transaction costs of action and how large are the costs of non-
action?
• How synergetic will a certain arrangement function in relation with others?
• Most importantly, who is legitimised to pass judgement on all of this, in
particular in transgovernance setups?
Accepting second modernity fully one has to argue that the effectiveness of
global institutions is furthered by the simultaneous existence of local and regional
institutions. This demands a well thought out division of scarce attention. If
agreements between neighbours are generally more effective, the streamlining
through a global organisation only would even be harmful.
Indeed, the complexity of the position of nation-states is illustrated by this:
reasoning in second modernity terms they will continuously ask themselves how
a certain arrangement on a certain level, for instance a global treaty, should be
accompanied by arrangements on other levels in order to produce synergies. They
will accept the need for complementarities. Although the world has become more
polycentric than before, nation-states appear to be the natural process architects in
order to both operate in a global landscape and combine the complementary efforts
on different levels by a varied collection of actors.
If you look for what could come out of Rio+20 [. . .] about sustainable development, in the
best case you can have some agreements on a general goal, but the real action has to be done
on the ground floor – at the level of states and local governments. And as you said of course
it’s also all about the individuals’ behaviour. If each of us uses electric lights or other
electric machines – normally we use them because this is what all people need and do. So
changing behaviour will be a big step. Just because we still think that what ‘I’ do will not
really affect much or anything. (Staffan Nilsson)
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8.2.8 Crowds/Publics/Social Tipping Points
The world has become connected, flat, spiky and lateral. Traditionally we speak
about levels of governance, ordered by hierarchy, but this type of order is in
disarray. The vertical order is not disintegrating altogether but lateral arrangements,
enabled by the Internet and communication technology, could possibly mean that
a local initiative becomes a global hype within a very short time. Our analysis of
societies must therefore also take into account new shapes of social organisation
with potential influence like crowds and publics.
The wisdom of crowds may prove to be doubtful as universally characteristic (see
Barbara Tuchman’s TheMarch of Folly, 1984), but crowd sourcing is often effective.
Of course it demands a thorough approach to define the objectives of the search, the
nature and size of the crowd, and the method used to select the collected information.
A crowd is not necessarily a random crowd. Expertise within the crowd is relevant.
If you look now, we have spring; there are a lot of observations in the nature of birds, of
animals, of the flora, of what is happening. And a government can never, never monitor this
without the help of engaged people in organizations looking for the birds’ life or walking in
the forest reporting, to take just an example or two. So it is really in my view a bottom-up
approach which is needed, both when we make and when we implement policies. (Staffan
Nilsson)
‘Publics’ are even more difficult to approach. Publics are event related. As
Basten (2010) argues, publics may gain political momentum, once there is an
institutional void in the respect that the traditional democratic institutions fail to
solve problems. However, it is also possible to utilise publics: the supporters of
soccer clubs have convinced many local public authorities that it would be proper to
subsidise professional soccer.
Each actor who is interested in sustainable development may attempt to activate
the existing or emerging publics in that domain. With this, the repertoire of each
actor is enriched but also complicated. The choice of the mix of approaches to apply
is a matter of primary concern: the classical method of building alliances with the
well-established actors like governments on different levels, or designing networks
can be supplemented with crowd sourcing and the utilisation of publics. In some
instances publics – for instance gathering on a large square – mark a social tipping
point, and may gain so much political influence that regimes topple down, as can be
seen once more in the spring of 2011. It appears that not only governing bodies but
also and maybe in particular NGOs should reflect upon the opportunities offered by
the potential meetings with crowds and publics.
8.2.9 New Institutions and Fading Away of Old Ones
I don’t think you have support for new institutions. Not at the moment. I certainly can’t see
the U.S. subscribing, and it’s going to be a struggle to keep up our ability to work within the
already existing ones. (Eileen Claussen)
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8.2.9.1 Courts and Truth Committees
New institutions belong to the dreams of many structuralists in the dialogue. We
have already discussed the continuous plea for a global decision-making body
which would enable strong coordination. We have also raised doubts about the
question of whether such a body would be able to cope with the existing cultural
heterogeneity.
Some have formulated ideas on new institutions for conflict resolution. The
erection of an international court is one of them.7 Indeed, in 2002 a large interna-
tional group of judges had already concluded that ‘an independent judiciary and
judicial process is vital for the implementation, development and enforcement of
environmental law’. The idea of the Forum is that that the Court could impose
sanctions such as declaratory relief, fines and sanctions of restoration and rehabili-
tation of damaged habitats. Not only states but also NGOs, corporations and
citizens would have access to the Court. It appears inevitable however to agree
on a treaty that would establish the Court. Every one shares the opinion that it would
take quite some time to decide on such a treaty. It is improbable that all nation-
states will become Signatory States, which would harm the universal character of
the judiciary.
Meanwhile, there is room for other mechanisms of conflict resolution. As the
long run future of sustainable development should be characterised by harmony, the
installation of truth committees operating according to the South African example
would maybe be preferable. The moral authority of such committees would not
necessarily be inferior to that of the Courts.
8.2.9.2 Informal Communities
The rapid rise of the social media enables all kinds of new communities. Many of
them will be quite volatile, like publics and crowds, but some might become stable
and unfold actions, or even programmes. In an earlier paragraph we have designed
a private-public network, consisting of corporations, citizen groups and scientific
bodies, which will further sustainable technologies, while public bodies ensure
a level playing field.
We need an international level playing field for companies – otherwise they will only
compete on the basis of cost reduction and not on the basis of sustainability. (Jan Pronk)
The level playing field is, however, not an undisputed concept. Level playing
fields are more or less paradoxical because they define equality in conditions in
order to enable market actors to cause inequality.
7 See for instance www.earthsummit2012.org for the Stakeholder Forum published in February
2011: Environmental Institutions for the twenty-first century: An International Court for the
Environment.
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There are no level playing fields. It is nice to say but it will never happen. When I was in
business, I wanted a playing field that was supportive of what I was trying to do – not what
others were trying to do. (Bj€orn Stigson)
Building institutions is a slow process. Attempts at acceleration are dangerous.
When we deal with long term problems we have already formulated a number of
recipes: depending on the character of the problem either persistent or resilient
action is needed. The gradual establishment of institutions demands persistency
during a longer period of time. As we argued while dealing with configurations,
gradual solidification both in the cognitive and in the social dimension takes place.
Such institutions might avoid the usable market failures, but maybe also the non-
market failures which states inevitably reproduce. The existing actors should
become aware of the possibly benign functioning of such new institutions and
create spaces where initiatives could breed.
The dynamic conservatism and the resilience of unsustainable institutions are
matters of concern for many observers. Some argue in favour of a crusade against
such anomalies. In our approach we would not prepare for external interventions,
but would instead aim at the possibility of intraventions, hollowing out such
institutions from the inside. Implosion would be the ultimate success.
8.2.10 Governance Indicators and Assessments
Many people are fond of performance indicators. They clarify the details of the test
which must be passed by accountable decision-makers. They create a transparent
dialogue. They specify what it is all about. Alas however, the empirical results are
often disappointing because:
• The indicators apparently do not adequately reflect the values of the parties
concerned.
• Behavioural reactions and immunising strategies gradually devastate the mean-
ing of the indicators.
• The indicators appear insufficiently flexible, and so became obsolete.
The points mentioned above are only a few of the many explanations for failure.
In reaction to the observation of failure some policy designers have returned to the
world of principles, and have re-introduced principle based accountability as
opposed to indicator or rule based accountability and supervision.
In earlier situations the indicators themselves are decided upon by the highest
hierarchical actor. In a knowledge democracy the performance indicators (what
counts?) would be decided in societal dialogues. Those would bear an iterative
character. Learning experiences would be collected continuously. Relevant changes
in values would become visible at the earliest possible moment.
To sustain these dialogues, periodical societal ‘balance sheets’ on aspects of
sustainable development would be produced by knowledge brokers such as advi-
sory councils, think tanks and planning bureaus, whereby progress or deterioration
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would be mentioned. Such balance sheets, sometimes using the metaphor of traffic
lights, have already become more popular over the last few years.
Thermometers for the quality of democracy, in particular participatory democ-
racy, could also be designed. Even very specific assessment on the evolution of the
green arrows in our knowledge democracy scheme could take place. Timely
renewal of all decision support mechanisms would be crucial.
8.2.11 Concluding Remarks
We have concentrated on governance, not on domains. By doing so, we do not
suggest that the distinction in domains is irrelevant. Of course the situation with
regards to forestry differs from the carbon emissions environment. Of course, a
contingent approach is necessary for each domain. However, the interdependencies
of all biosphere systems also demand overview and linkages.
We have hardly touched on the myth of urgency, of momentum, and of
opportunita. Macchiavelli has already said a lot on the latter. It is the genius of
leadership, or the collective intuition of communities which will be the decisive
factor here.
8.2.12 Who Should Do WHAT and WHEN?
In open societies the reflection upon and creation of governance are a matter for all
citizens, and many private and public organisations. In accordance with values and
responsibilities each organisation will act in its own way. Firms will accept their
responsibilities for fair markets and more sustainable technologies, while public
actors will provide level playing fields, collective goods and redistribution in
accordance with preferences on distributive justice. Everyone can accept a morally
binding obligation, but the monopoly on creation of legally binding arrangements is
in the hands of states. Complementary positions demand empathy as relational
value all the time.
The complex interactive relationships which characterise transitions necessitate
for each actor a high degree of consciousness on possible options for new
combinations, and continuous learning capacity. In knowledge democracies, ‘mind-
fulness’ marks the competence to operate in cultural diversity, and to aim at
compatibility and congruence of values and actions. Action perspectives have to
be multi-fold.
Transdisciplinarity and participatory democracy contain the intraventions that
enable change, transition, and transformation. As sustainable development should
be rooted in adequate value patterns and frameworks of competences, the efforts of
many should be directed towards learning processes that further these values. The
value of setting up time tables and indicators is well understood if those are used a
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benchmarks and bearing points. Any overestimation and any misunderstanding as
absolute physical planning items make them obsolete, because under these
circumstances they produce many adverse effects in reflexive environments.
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